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The financial crisis clearly illustrated the importance of characterizing the level of ‘systemic’ risk associated
with an entire credit network, rather than with single institutions. However, the interplay between financial
distress and topological changes is still poorly understood. Here we analyze the quarterly interbank
exposures among Dutch banks over the period 1998–2008, ending with the crisis. After controlling for the
link density, many topological properties display an abrupt change in 2008, providing a clear – but
unpredictable – signature of the crisis. By contrast, if the heterogeneity of banks’ connectivity is controlled
for, the same properties show a gradual transition to the crisis, starting in 2005 and preceded by an even
earlier period during which anomalous debt loops could have led to the underestimation of counter-party
risk. These early-warning signals are undetectable if the network is reconstructed from partial bank-specific
data, as routinely done. We discuss important implications for bank regulatory policies.
F
inancial and banking systems are strongly interconnected networks of institutions exposed to both endo-
genous and exogenous fluctuations1,2. When defaults occur, they cascade throughout the network and can
cause the collapse of an entire system, as dramatically witnessed by the recent financial crisis3. As a
consequence, the analysis of economic and financial networks as the propagation channel for distress has received
a lot of attention4–18. Much effort has been devoted to the search for regularities in the structure of financial
networks, i.e. looking for degree heterogeneity, a core-periphery or a modular structure8–12. Similarly, null models
have been introduced in order to understand whether part of the observed topological complexity can be
explained relatively simply in terms of the observed heterogeneity of vertices13–17. For interbank networks
specifically, a lot of attention has been devoted to quantifying the level of systemic risk (the risk of the collapse
of the system as a whole) determined by a particular network topology, as opposed to the traditional measures of
risk defined for indidividual banks18–21. It turns out that the minimization of (standard measures of) individual
risk can often increase the level of systemic risk, which in turn can hurt individual financial entities1,2. This
highlights the inadequacy of traditional models and regulation and suggests an analogy with ecological
networks22,23.
All the above approaches focus on the structural properties (e.g. systemic risk), associated with a given, static
network topology. However, interbank networks are highly dynamic. As distress starts to propagate, existing
financial connections might dissolve and new ones might materialize, modifying the way further reverberations of
a crisis are channeled through the network. Therefore, one needs to take into account both the (expected) effects
of network topology on the stability of the financial system and the reverse effects of (realized) defaults on the
structure of interbank networks. This has led to models of interbank networks that dynamically adapt to critical
events, with a continuous feedback between topology and dynamics24.
In this paper, rather than introducing a theoretical model, we carry out an empirical characterization of the
interplay between realized financial stress and the changes in the observed interbank structure. We address two
main questions: does the topology of an interbank network undergo major structural change as a crisis suddenly
manifests itself? And if so, are there any topological precursors of this structural change, to be used as early-warning
signals of the approaching crisis? Our results indicate that the answer to both questions is affirmative.
Results
Data. For our analysis we focus on the recent global financial crisis, that manifested itself at the end of 2007 and
continued throughout 20083, and on its build-up phase, which is much more difficult to identify. We selected a
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the first quarter of 1998 and ending with the last quarter of 20089.
Each snapshot reports the exposures between Dutch banks at the end
of the corresponding quarter, and represents them as binary links
directed from the borrower to the lender. Our data include the year
when the crisis manifested itself in its strongest form (2008) plus the
preceding 10 years, arguably the build-up phase. More details about
the data are given in the Supplementary Information (SI). Note that,
when studying the propagation of defaults, the binary topology of
interbank networks plays the primary role. The magnitude of the
connections, while surely important, plays mainly a quantitative
role. For instance, the existence and uniqueness of a ‘clearing
payment vector’ that clears the obligations of all banks after a
default only depends on the interbank topology21. Moreover, while
a weighted network is of course more informative than its binary
projection, recent empirical results15–17 have shown that the
knowledge of a binary property often conveys more information
about a real-world economic network than the knowledge of the
corresponding weighted property.
Topological signatures of the crisis. We start by looking for possible
topological signatures of the crisis. We find that, at the onset of the
crisis the size (numbers of vertices N), the connectedness (number of
links L) and the link density (or connectance c) of the network (see
fig. 1 right) do not show any significant change in their (roughly
stationary) trends (see fig. 1 left).
We can also separately consider the density of the core and of the
periphery of the network9: the ideal core-periphery model (CP
model) assumes that core banks are all bilaterally linked with each
other, that periphery banks do not lend to each other, and that core
banks both lend to and borrow from at least one periphery bank
(discussed further in9 and SI). From the right panel of fig. 1, we
confirm that the core is much denser than the periphery (as by
construction should be). However, the core- and periphery-specific
densities, exactly as the overall density, show only a slight jump from
the end of 2007 to the beginning of 2008. The size of the change is not
significant, as it is of the same order as the fluctuations characterizing
the entire 11-years time interval. Taken together, the above results
show that the size and density of the network (as well as their core-
specific and periphery-specific values) are completely uninformative
about the crisis.
However, we are going to show that the picture changes if, after
controlling for the size and density themselves, we consider higher-
order topological properties (dyadic, triadic, and so on). We first
focus on the relative frequency or abundances of the three possible
dyadic motifs in the observed network, i.e. the number L« of reci-
procated (full) dyads, the number LR of non-reciprocated (single)
dyads, and the number L«/ of empty dyads (see fig. 2). These numbers
are informative only after filtering out size and density effects, or
even more complicated topological properties. Therefore, here and in
what follows, we compare each measured quantity X with the
expected value ÆXæ under a null model which has some properties
in common with the observed network but is otherwise maximally
random. More precisely, we introduce z-scores (see Methods section)
to quantify the deviation between data and null model. Technically,
the method we adopt is an analytical and unbiased one25 based on
maximum-entropy ensembles of graphs with constraints26 (see SI for
details). We stress that the use of a null model is very different from
that of a proper explanatory model: throughout the entire paper, we
do not aim at introducing a model that accurately reproduces the
data. Rather, the null models we define represent different bench-
marks, with various levels of complexity, that discount for the imme-
diate effects of certain topological properties treated as constraints.
Comparing the data with the predictions of a null model allows us to
determine which observed structural properties are not simply
explained by the constraint specifying the null model itself. Indeed,
our most informative findings will correspond to a deviation, rather
than an agreement, with null models. It should therefore be clear that
null models are by construction in-sample, as it would make no sense
to control, in one snapshot of the network, for the effects of a topo-
logical property observed in a different snapshot. The inherently in-
sample nature of null models is very different from the out-of-sample
one of explanatory models, where the fit with one snapshot of the
data is used to reproduce different snapshots.
In the left panels of fig. 2 we show the evolution of the z-scores over
time23,27–29 for each of the three dyadic motifs, under a null model that
controls for the size and density of the network. The Directed
Random Graph (DRG), the directed version of the Erdős-Rényi ran-
dom graph model (see SI) is such null model. Note that the z-score is
a convenient measure as it immediately shows which motifs diverge
significantly from the null model (see Methods section). We find
that, while the size and density of the network are relatively stable
throughout the entire period, all the dyadic z-scores show an abrupt
jump in 2008. The crisis period (highlighted in ochre in fig. 2) is
characterized by a sudden decrease of the abundance of full and
empty dyads, and a sudden increase of the abundance of single dyads.
Note that, before the crisis, the number of reciprocated dyads is
significantly larger than the expected one, while during the crisis it
becomes marginally consistent with the null model (i.e., the random
graph).
Similarly, the observed abundances of single and empty dyads
become consistent with the null model in 2008. Since the total num-
ber of links is more or less stable, the net effect we see is that recip-
rocal connections suddenly ‘decouple’ and fill previously empty
dyads, making single dyads increase and empty dyads decrease with
respect to their expected abundance level. So the network seems to
suddenly evolve from a fluctuating but roughly stationary configura-
tion (with few single dyads and many full and empty ones) to a ‘crisis’
Figure 1 | Left: observed number of vertices (black) and links (gray). Right: observed density of the whole network (black), of the core (red) and of the
periphery (brown). The y-scale is logarithmically spaced in both cases.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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configuration whose dyadic structure is marginally consistent with
that of an unstructured random graph. We denote this sudden loss of
structure as the ‘collapse’ of the original network.
The dyadic motifs, when using the DRG as a reference, are there-
fore clear topological signatures of the crisis. They are however not
predictive, since they show an abrupt transition with no evidence of a
preceding build-up phase. They allow us to ‘see’ the crisis, but not to
‘foresee’ it.
Early-warning topological precursors: the pre-crisis phase. Sur-
prisingly, the picture changes completely if we consider a more
stringent null model where the intrinsic heterogeneity of banks is
accurately controlled for. In particular, we compare each snapshot of
the network with a null model (known as the Directed Configuration
Model (DCM)) where the number of in- and out-going links of each
bank is kept equal to the observed values. For a discussion of the
properties of the degree distribution(s) of this network, see9.
Note that the DRG is an unlikely benchmark economically as the
degrees of all banks are narrowly distributed around their empirical
average value and banks are thus forced to be similar in size. As a
consequence, when studying the deviations of the real network from
the DRG, we cannot disentangle the effects of unrealistic bank-
specific properties from those of genuine higher-order (dyadic and
beyond) patterns. Incidentally, this shows the main limitation of the
representative agent concept when applied to economic networks30.
By contrast, the DCM indirectly preserves the real heterogeneity
of banks, by preserving the observed degrees produced by that
heterogeneity. This provides a realistic benchmark with deviations
indicating a genuine signature of higher-order effects beyond the
bank-specific level, directly arising from the choices of banks.
The second column of fig. 2 shows the dyadic z-scores under
the DCM. When comparing these values with the previous ones
obtained under the DRG, we find surprising results. Firstly, during
the first seven years (quarters 1–28, i.e. from 1998 to 2004
included) all z-scores are stationary and have the same sign as
under the DRG, but are much closer to zero. Their small absolute
value ( zj j *v 2:5) suggests that during this period the dyadic struc-
ture of the network is not far from the prediction obtained under
the DCM, i.e. it is roughly explained by the heterogeneous degrees
of banks. By contrast, starting from the 29th quarter (2005Q1), all
z-scores suddenly change sign and start to move away from their
previous stationary values. This gradually leads to the collapsed
network configuration of 2008. The network is then the most
distant from the DCM (and, as we observed before, the closest
to the DRG). However, the ‘collapse’ is not a sudden structural
change, as it is clearly preceded by a 3-year ‘pre-crisis’ period
Figure 2 | Temporal evolution of the dyadic z-scores: zL< under the DRG (top-left, purple circles) and the DCM (top-right, blue circles), zL? under the
DRG (middle-left, purple, full squares) and the DCM (middle-right, blue, full squares), zL«/ under the DRG (bottom-left, purple, empty squares) and
the DCM (bottom-right, blue, empty squares).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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(from 2005 to 2007 included, highlighted in purple in fig. 2)
bridging the earlier stationary phase to the 2008 crisis.
Our results shown so far suggest that, compared to a homogeneous
benchmark, the interbank network displays an abrupt structural
transition at the onset of the crisis. In contrast, with a heterogeneous
benchmark, the transition is slow and continuous and highlights a
gradual build-up phase starting three years in advance of the crisis.
The pre-crisis phase is thus an early-warning signal of the upcoming
topological collapse.
Topological patterns captured by dyadic motifs are limited to
correlations within pairs of vertices. In order to study a higher level
of organization, we now analyse the triadic motifs23,27–29, i.e. the pos-
sible patterns involving three connected vertices.
Exactly as for the dyads, we consider the z-scores for the abun-
dances of each of the 13 triadic motifs (see SI for definitions).
However, before considering the development of individual z-scores
over time, we first identify the most significant motifs by comparing all
13 z-scores with each other in sub-periods. This results in the ‘motif
profiles’27,29 shown in fig. 3, where we used the DCM as the null model.
It turns out that the 44 quarterly snapshots do not collapse to a
single profile (see SI). By contrast, we can clearly distinguished four
subperiods with different characteristic profiles, as evident from the
four panels of fig. 3. Remarkably, we find that the last two subperiods
coincide exactly with the pre-crisis (2005–2007) and crisis (2008)
periods we identified before.
As is clear from the bottom right panel of fig. 3, we can identify the
motifs number 2, 5, 10 and 12 as the most significant ( zj j *w 4:5)
triadic signatures of the 2008 crisis. If we now track these motifs over
time (see left panels of fig. 4), we find exactly the same behavior as
shown above for the dyads: the trends over the entire 1998–2004
period are stationary (with small z-scores indicating an approximate
accordance with the DCM), and from 2005 onwards they gradually
evolve towards the collapsed configuration (for motif 10 the depar-
ture actually starts before 2005, but this anomaly will be corrected by
a more constrained null model, as we show below). This confirms
that the building-up of the crisis is undetectable under homogeneous
assumptions, while it becomes manifest in the gradual divergence of
the real interbank market from the configuration expected on the
basis of the observed heterogeneity of banks.
Clearly, since triads are combinations of dyads, some triadic
motifs might be over(under)-represented just because the dyadic
motifs they contain are over(under)-represented, in which case
the triad as a whole should not be considered an interesting pattern
per se. In order to control for this, we introduce a more stringent
null model that separately controls for the number of single and
reciprocated links of each vertex (Reciprocal Configuration Model
(RCM), see SI for details). The RCM separately preserves the num-
ber of empty, full, and single (out- and inward) dyads in which each
vertex is involved. As a result, all the observed dyadic abundances
are preserved and the dyadic z-scores are zero by construction. In
the right panels of fig. 4 we show the triadic z-scores for the same
motifs considered previously, but now recalculated under the RCM.
We find that motif 2 shows the same trend as before and motif 10,
falling in line with it, now confirms the beginning of the pre-crisis
phase in 2005. This indicates that motifs 2 and 10 are important
building blocks of the network. Motifs 5 and 12 are instead no longer
Figure 3 | Triadic z-scores for all the 44 quarters, grouped into four subperiods, under the DCM. First subperiod: t1–t10 (top-left); second subperiod:
t11–t28 (top-right); third subperiod: t29–t40 (bottom-left); fourth subperiod: t41–t44 (bottom-right).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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significant ( zj j *v 3:5), and their fluctuating trends do not show any
appreciable change during the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
The earliest precursor: anomalous circular lending. What remains
to be explained is the nature of the separation (occurring in the mid
of 2000) between the first two subperiods shown previously in fig. 3,
as all the trends considered so far do not display any significant
change at that particular point in time.
Before answering this question, we stress that although fig. 3 might
look quite different under the RCM, we find similar results in that
case as well. As before, the motif profiles calculated under the RCM
over the entire 1998–2008 period do not collapse to a universal
distribution (see SI). Still, inside each of the four subperiods we
identified earlier, the profiles are coherent (see fig. 5).
Remarkably, the first regime is now almost completely consistent
with the null model ( zj j *v 4 for all 13 motifs), which means that the
Figure 4 | Temporal evolution of the triadic z-score for motifs 2, 5, 10 and 12 under the DCM (left) and the RCM (right).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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heterogeneous local connectivity and reciprocity of banks entirely
explain the triadic structure. Moreover, if we now look more closely
at figs. 3 and 5, we find that the main differences between the first two
subperiods are determined by motifs 9 (under both the DCM and
RCM) and 10 (under the DCM, but not the RCM).
Thus the only significant change occurring in the middle of 2000,
after controlling for the dyadic structure, is due to motif 9. The
temporal evolution of the latter is reported in fig. 6, under both null
models. We find that, from the third quarter of 2000 to the last
quarter of 2004, motif 9 indeed shows a marked difference with
respect to the rest of the period, and turns out to be strongly over-
represented, highlighting an anomalously high number of triads of
banks involved in circular lending loops with no reciprocation. Since
this subperiod is only characterized by the over-representation of
motif 9 (all other motifs are still approximately consistent with the
RCM), we denote it as the ‘cyclic anomaly’ phase (highlighted in pink
in figs. 5 and 6), and regard it as the earliest precursor of the 2008
crisis. Remarkably, when the cyclic anomaly phase ends and the pre-
crisis phase begins, motif 9 suddenly changes from being the stron-
gest over-represented to being the strongest under-represented motif
under the RCM (while not significant under the DCM). Thus, it
appears that non-reciprocated lending loops, that were the arrange-
ment preferred by triads of banks before 2005, suddenly became the
‘most avoided’ triad. The following two periods (pre-crisis and crisis)
are indeed mainly characterized by an increasingly strong under-
representation of motifs 9 and 10 (see figs. 4, 5 and 6), which both
involve a circular lending loop.
Discussion
The above results have potentially strong implications for bank regu-
lation policies. An immediate one is that the popular view that real
interbank markets consist of a well defined core-periphery structure,
and consequently that banks can be binarily classified either as big/
central or as small/peripheral, is far too simple. Our findings show
that the observed heterogeneity of banks is irreducible to the core-
periphery dichotomy. Rather, the opposite is true: given the observed
heterogeneity of banks, the network is found to have no significant
core-periphery structure, and sometimes even has an ‘anti-core’ one
(see SI).
The approximate consistency between the real network and the
RCM in the initial 1998–2000 period also suggests that, in absence of
distress, the topology of real interbank networks might be quite
accurately reconstructed using only the knowledge of the number
of (inward, outward, and reciprocated) partners of each bank.
Technically, this means that, under low stress, real interbank net-
works might be typical members of an equilibrium statistical
ensemble of graphs, where banks’ connectivities are maximally
informative. In practical terms, it means that to characterize the
network, data requirements are very limited.
However, and more importantly, our findings also show that dur-
ing the build-up of crises the network can keep moving away from
the expectations derived only from the knowledge of bank-specific
properties. In this out-of-equilibrium regime, the local connectivities
of banks become less and less informative about the network as a
whole. This loss of topological predictability speaks against the use of
Figure 5 | Triadic z-scores for all the 44 quarters, grouped into four subperiods, under the RCM. First subperiod: t1–t10 (top-left); second subperiod:
t11–t28 (top-right); third subperiod: t29–t40 (bottom-left); fourth subperiod: t41–t44 (bottom-right).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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maximum-entropy techniques aimed at reconstructing the most
likely configuration of an (unobserved) interbank network when
only local information about the total assets and liabilities of each
bank is available14. Since assets and liabilities are the (transaction)
weighted counterparts of the in- and out-degree of a bank, our results
suggest that this technique might yield a realistic guess of the real
network only in tranquil times. When the network is under stress,
maximum-entropy would instead provide a greatly distorted picture
of it.
Strikingly, if our analysis had been carried out on the most likely
network consistent with the observed degrees (i.e. the DCM), then
every dyadic, triadic, or core-periphery property would have
appeared, at each point in time, as perfectly consistent with the
configuration model. Supervision based only on bank-specific
information, and not on the knowledge of the entire network, is thus
likely to remain oblivious to warning signals of structural changes in
the run-up to the crisis.
Moreover, both reciprocity and triadic structure have implications
for counterparty risk assessment. As other authors have already
pointed out24,31, Over-the-Counter (OTC, i.e. not disclosed to third
parties) transactions intrinsically generate risk externalities: if bank A
issues loans to banks B and C, it will require an interest rate that
depends on the estimated counterparty risk (which is a function of
the fluctuating financial variables on which the ‘health’ of banks B
and C depend). But if B issues another loan to C, and A is not aware of
this, the interest rate charged by A will underprice counterparty risk,
since B becomes vulnerable to a default of C, increasing the correla-
tion between the health of B and that of C. Note that this particular
triad is motif number 5. This example shows that the binary topology
of interbank networks (more than the intensity of links) has direct
effects on systemic risk, and also highlights that some triadic motifs
are strongly affected by risk externalities.
Now, it should be noted that the unreciprocated 3-loop (motif
number 9) maximizes the underestimation of risk in OTC transac-
tions: each of the three banks involved is not aware of the fact that
counterparty risk loops back to itself, creating correlations not incor-
porated in their bilateral risk pricing. This suggests that, during the
cyclic anomaly phase, banks might have systematically underesti-
mated risk externalities.
Note that circularity itself is not necessarily associated with strong
risk externalities; but unreciprocated circularity is. For instance,
within a full dyad, risk loops back between the two banks as well.
But in this case both parties are aware of it, and can properly include
the increased correlation in their risk pricing. Also note that, while
full dyads are still prone to the risk externality involving a third party,
this will be a smaller effect since the probability that risk loops back
along a longer chain of defaults is smaller than that of risk looping
back within the dyad itself. Thus, at a dyadic level, single dyads are the
most prone to the underestimation of counterparty risk, precisely
because they can become parts of unreciprocated loops. Again, this
effect is purely topological: in a mutual dyad with two positive but
strongly asymmetric weights, both banks can still incorporate these
weights to properly price their risk. Only if one weight is zero, i.e. in a
single dyad, this is no longer possible. This further explains why the
key information relevant to us is encoded in the binary topology, and
not in the intensity of connections. By contrast, at a triadic level, 3-
loops involving an increasing number of reciprocated dyads (motifs
number 9, 10, 12 and 13 respectively, see SI) are increasingly less
prone to the risk externality. Unreciprocated loops (of any length
greater than 2) can therefore be considered to be a sort of ‘autocata-
lytic risk loops’. Since longer loops imply smaller probabilities of
cascading defaults, presumably the most dangerous autocatalytic risk
loops are precisely those involving three banks.
During the cyclic anomaly phase, all the partly reciprocated loops
(motifs 10, 12, 13) were much less abundant than the completely
unreciprocated 3-loop (and always consistent with both null models
(DCM and RCM)) thus increasing systemic risk. During the pre-crisis
phase, the loops with small or no reciprocation (motifs 10 and 9)
became increasingly under-represented (figs. 4 and 6). Unfortunately,
during the same period reciprocated dyads (that dominated the earlier
phase) also became increasingly under-represented, and outnumbered
by single dyads (fig. 2). This suggests that, starting from 2005, the
underestimation of systemic risk might have progressively increased,
first due to autocatalytic risk loops during the cyclic anomaly phase and
on a simpler, dyadic level during the pre-crisis phase.
These considerations show that OTC transactions have the potential
to create unintentional but emergent, self-reinforcing and destabilizing
patterns and feeds into the debate on how OTC markets can be mon-
itored and regulated. Since our results on ‘risk autocatalysis’ suggests
that, even when banks spontaneously engage in reciprocated transac-
tions, autocatalytic risk loops can emerge (in the cyclic anomaly phase
the reciprocity is still high, cf fig. 5), simply requiring that banks
reciprocate a fair amount of transactions (unless this means all trans-
actions) is not enough to prevent the creation of unreciprocated loops.
One possibility is to introduce a Central Clearing Counterparty (CCP)
who would step in the middle of bilateral OTC trades. Although this
would reduce the systemic risk due to private interaction, it does intro-
duce the (systemic) risk that the CCP can fail as well. Another
approach is to start properly monitoring OTC markets, acting on
anomalous motifs. Given the data collection efforts underway for
instance in the UK and internationally at the Bank for International
Settlements this could be concretely considered (Refs. 32,33).
Although our results are strong on providing early warning sig-
nals, they cannot explain the economic rationale for the observed
network patterns. As the links are formed in an OTC market, the
participants only knowingly create the dyads, not the triadic motifs.
A standard explanation is that financial markets are used to hedge
risks34. Unexpected idiosyncratic shocks are covered in the market,
Figure 6 | Temporal evolution of the triadic z-score for motif number 9, under the DCM (left) and under the RCM (right).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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either through a cash transaction or through a longer running (deriv-
ative) transaction. If things change, which is likely given that shocks
arrive continuously, banks generally do not close out a contract but
take out a second contract in the opposite direction. Over a reporting
period this would lead to significant gross exposure (but much lower
net exposure). As during the Great Moderation prior to the crisis,
shocks were small, the need to enter into ever more insurance/
hedging contracts diminished and thus the probability that any
uni-directional link would turn into a reciprocal link became smaller.
However, since the ‘phase’ transition is taking place both in tran-
quil and stressed times we need a second explanation for our result:
in tranquil times everyone became an acceptable counterparty so
hedges no longer needed to be effectuated with existing, known
counterparties. Therefore reciprocal dyads slowly became under
represented. As the crisis arrived, however, banks seem to actively
try to find unconnected parties and thus the existing development
towards fewer reciprocal dyads intensified. Such behaviour might be
driven by bank’s aiming for more diversification, both on the asset
and the liability side, achieved by breaking existing links and forming
links with hitherto unrelated nodes.
In sum, our results clearly indicate that further theoretical and
empirical research is needed to understand the economics of network
formation. More generally, any policy directed at regulating inter-
bank markets in a ‘pairwise’ fashion appears to be fundamentally
ineffective, since the most significant patterns are found to occur at
an irreducibly triadic level. This result moves the regulation target
even further away: while the notion of systemic risk already implies
that monitoring individual banks is insufficient to contain systemic
risk, monitoring pairs of banks is also likely to fail; the minimal
‘building blocks’ appear to be triples of banks.
Methods
In order to detect the statistically significant deviations of a measured quantity X from
the expected value ÆXæ, we calculated standard deviation s[X] under the null model
and define the z-score
zX:
X{ Xh i
s X½  ð1Þ
The z-score is a standardized variable measuring the difference between the observed
and the expected value in units of standard deviation. If X is normally distributed
under the null model, then values within z 5 61, z 5 62, z 5 63 would
(approximately) occur with a 68%, 95%, 99% probability respectively. If the observed
value of X corresponds to a large positive (negative) value of zX then the quantity X is
over(under)-represented in the data, and not explained by the null model. For most of
the topological properties we consider (i.e. dyads and core-periphery structure), the
normality under the null model is either trivially ensured by the Central Limit
Theorem (CLT), or checked numerically (see SI). The CLT cannot be invoked for
triads due to statistical dependencies among the random variables involved (triads
necessarily share dyads, and are therefore not independent of each other). Still, larger
z-scores identify more significant patterns. Even if null models do not represent, by
themselves, a forecasting procedure, it is nevertheless possible to use our analysis to
detect a temporal trend, once the deviations highlighted by the z-scores analysis are
plotted versus time. The resulting trends, clearly underlining an ongoing structural
change, can be interpreted as the starting point of a predictive inference procedure.
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